| Date | Event | Debate it resolves | Deciding threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thu Oct 22, 2026 | Q2 FY2027 print | HOKA glide | HOKA ≥ +8% pass / ≤ +5% fail; revenue ≥ $1,490M |
| Late Jan 2027 | Q3 FY2027 print | Guided second-half (H2) acceleration | HOKA ≥ low-double digits for the quarter |
| May 2027 | Q4 FY2027 + FY2028 guide | FY2028–30 framework | High-single-digit revenue growth, low-20s%+ operating margin |
This page is refreshed after each print, and each print is scored against the checkpoint thresholds at the bottom of the page.
The price pays for a decade of decline;
the record is a decade of delivery.
The bar is −2.1%/yr owner-earnings growth for a decade, CAP ≈ 0 years. The record is +14.8%/yr revenue compounding and a guidance machine that has beaten every full-year guide it has issued across 12 quarters. The gap between those two sentences is the thesis.
| Debate | What the price assumes | What the record shows | Resolving event + date | What would change the read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MOAT — “Is HOKA's glide a glide, or a cliff edge?” (THE contested driver) | Deceleration continues through the low-double-digit guide toward low-single digits and stays there | +46% → +24% → +15.9% → low-double digits guided; slowest print +7.7% (Q1 FY2027) blamed on shipment timing; sell-through ahead of sell-in (Caroti, Oct 23, 2025) | Q2 FY2027 print, Thu Oct 22, 2026 | Two straight prints at ≤ +5% would convert glide to cliff; ≥ +8% on Oct 22 keeps the glide intact |
| MOAT — “Is UGG a seasonal boot or a year-round franchise?” | Discretionary, weather-exposed demand fades back toward its FY2023 decline (−2.7%) | Re-accelerated to +13% (FY2025) and +8.2% (FY2026) at a 59.3% brand gross margin; the seasonal-to-year-round transition already happened | Q2 FY2027 print, Thu Oct 22, 2026 (UGG ≥ +4% pass / ≤ +1% fail) | A sub-+1% UGG print into its peak season reopens the cyclicality case |
| QUALITY — “Does the tariff shield hold at full-year rates?” | Pricing power that produced a ~$25M net FY2026 tariff cost breaks when rates persist — and management's own 20% Vietnam scenario carried a $185M gross cost | Gross estimates $110–185M were mitigated to ~$25M net; the FY2027 guide already assumes the 10% Vietnam rate holds all year and no refund (refunds are being pursued; none is assumed); gross margin still guides down to ~56.5% on freight and input costs, with freight and Middle East shipping disruption already cited in that guide | Tariff language at the Oct 22 print (any new FY2027 gross figure > $150M, or a tariff-cited margin guide cut, is the fail signal) | Management quantifying a gross cost above its own prior $185M scenario, or guiding margin down on tariffs specifically |
| QUALITY — “Is the U.S. stall contained?” | Domestic +0.2% (FY2026) is the start of a broader demand break in the 58.3% wholesale channel | International grew +26.8% in FY2026 to 42.0% of sales against a stated ~50% ambition; inventory fell −4.9% year over year (YoY) at the seasonal peak | Q2 FY2027 print + Sep 30 inventory (≤ +5% YoY pass / > +12% fail) | Inventory building double-digits while domestic stalls = a destock arriving unmonitored |
The record settles three of the four. The page is about the fourth.
Against the bar stands a delivery record with no guide cut in 12 quarters: FY2025 and FY2026 both beat their initial and final full-year guides on revenue, gross margin and EPS, and FY2027 is guided to revenue +7–8% with EPS already raised once. The tariff record, in management's own numbers, ran from a ~$150M gross estimate to ~$25M net delivered — with the explicit caveat that the net figure is not the run-rate if tariffs persist (the full bar arithmetic is in Reverse discounted cash flow (DCF)).
Beyond FY2027, management has laid out a FY2028–30 framework: high-single-digit revenue growth, operating margin in the low-20s percent or better, and low-double-digit EPS growth with buybacks. There is no investor day — strategy is communicated only through earnings guidance, and that framework is scored at the checkpoints below.
is not the run-rateif tariffs persist: the FY2027 guide assumes a 10% Vietnam rate all year and no refund, while the 20% scenario management itself modeled carried a $185M gross cost. Gross margin already guides down (57.7% → ~56.5%).
Sell-throughs are stronger than sell-in.UGG, at $2,751.7M TTM and a 38.2% segment margin, already made the year-round transition. Conceded: door counts are undisclosed, so the wholesale channel cannot be monitored from outside.
Deckers Outdoor Corporation (NYSE: DECK), headquartered in Goleta, California, designs and sells premium footwear through two global brands and a third smaller one. HOKA — $2,637.7M of TTM revenue — sells maximal-cushion running and outdoor shoes through run-specialty stores, sporting-goods wholesale, and its own stores and website. UGG ($2,751.7M) sells sheepskin boots and an expanding year-round line of slippers, sandals, and apparel-adjacent footwear. Teva (sandals) is the remainder, sitting inside an “Other brands” segment of $137.8M TTM after Sanuk was sold on Aug 15, 2024 and Koolaburra and AHNU were wound down across FY2025–FY2026. Teva's last disclosed standalone figure is FY2024 revenue of $148.5M — 61% of that year's $241.9M Other brands total; it has not been broken out since, which is why the "no third engine" claim above rests on the segment total, not on a current Teva line.
Products are made by independent manufacturers, primarily in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia; Deckers owns no factories. Sales split 58.3% wholesale / 41.7% direct-to-consumer (DTC), and 58% U.S. / 42% international. The company has no funded debt, $1,602.6M of cash, and has never paid a dividend — cash comes back to shareholders exclusively through share buybacks.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Stefano Caroti has run the company since Aug 1, 2024 — an internal promote who previously ran omni-channel and briefly HOKA itself. He succeeded Dave Powers, who retired cleanly: no executive-chair or consulting role, and he left the board in Sep 2025. The fiscal year ends March 31, so FY2026 is the year ended March 31, 2026, and the most recent reported quarter is Q1 FY2027, ended June 30, 2026.
| Line | FY25 | FY26 | TTM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | 4,985.6 | 5,472.3 | 5,527.3 |
| HOKA revenue | 2,233.1 | 2,587.3 | 2,637.7 |
| UGG revenue | 2,531.4 | 2,738.8 | 2,751.7 |
| Gross margin | 57.9% | 57.7% | 57.8% |
| Owner earnings | 920.4 | 1,052.5 | 1,071.0 |
| Period-end shares | 150.2M | 140.0M | 136.7M |
The full series is the reference table below; the charts between Management and Moat show the same three shapes.
Margin defense, in management's own Q1 FY2027 bridge: full-price/mix +~110 bps while absorbing a ~150 bps tariff headwind, closeouts +~60 bps, FX (foreign exchange) +~40 bps — gross margin still rose +60 bps YoY.
| Metric | Q2 FY26 | Q3 FY26 | Q4 FY26 | Q1 FY27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1,430.8M+9.1% | $1,957.5M+7.1% | $1,119.4M+9.6% | $1,019.5M+5.7% |
| HOKA growth | +11.1% | +18.5% | +14.5% | +7.7% |
| UGG growth | +10.1% | +4.9% | +9.2% | +4.9% |
| Gross margin | 56.2%+0.3 pts | 59.8%−0.5 pts | 57.6%+0.9 pts | 56.4%+0.6 pts |
| Diluted EPS | $1.82+14.5% | $3.33+11.0% | $0.96−4.0% | $0.94+1.1% |
Each value carries its same-quarter YoY change, colored. Guided for Q2 FY2027 on the Q1 call: revenue ~+5% (≈$1.50B), HOKA high-single digits, UGG mid-single digits, EPS $1.73–$1.78.
Fiscal years end March 31; TTM is the twelve months ended June 30, 2026. The final column is the FY2026 year-over-year change — the table's one signed-change column.
| Line | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | TTM | FY26 YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue by brand | |||||||
| HOKA | 891.6 | 1,412.9 | 1,806.7 | 2,233.1 | 2,587.3 | 2,637.7 | +15.9% |
| UGG | 1,982.0 | 1,929.2 | 2,239.1 | 2,531.4 | 2,738.8 | 2,751.7 | +8.2% |
| Other brands | 276.8 | 285.2 | 241.9 | 221.2 | 146.2 | 137.8 | — |
| Total net sales | 3,150.3 | 3,627.3 | 4,287.8 | 4,985.6 | 5,472.3 | 5,527.3 | +9.8% |
| Channel and geography | |||||||
| Wholesale | 1,936.7 | 2,160.7 | 2,432.3 | 2,855.9 | 3,208.1 | 3,222.5 | — |
| Direct-to-consumer | 1,213.6 | 1,466.6 | 1,855.5 | 2,129.7 | 2,264.2 | 2,304.8 | — |
| Domestic | 2,167.8 | 2,451.5 | 2,863.7 | 3,186.7 | 3,191.5 | 3,207.7 | +0.2% |
| International | 982.5 | 1,175.8 | 1,424.1 | 1,798.9 | 2,280.8 | 2,319.6 | +26.8% |
| Profitability | |||||||
| Gross margin | 51.0% | 50.3% | 55.6% | 57.9% | 57.7% | 57.8% | — |
| Operating income | 564.7 | 652.8 | 927.5 | 1,179.1 | 1,262.9 | 1,252.9 | +7.1% |
| Operating margin | 17.9% | 18.0% | 21.6% | 23.6% | 23.1% | 22.7% | — |
| Net income | 451.9 | 516.8 | 759.6 | 966.1 | 1,024.1 | 1,014.8 | +6.0% |
| Diluted EPS | $2.71† | $3.23 | $4.86 | $6.33 | $7.02 | $7.05‡ | +10.9% |
| Cash flow and owner earnings | |||||||
| Operating cash flow (OCF) | 172.4 | 537.4 | 1,033.2 | 1,044.5 | 1,182.0 | 1,193.7 | — |
| Capex | 51.0 | 81.0 | 89.4 | 86.2 | 84.6 | 75.9 | — |
| Free cash flow | 121.3 | 456.4 | 943.8 | 958.4 | 1,097.3 | 1,117.8 | +14.5% |
| Stock-based compensation | 26.8 | 26.9 | 37.3 | 37.9 | 44.8 | 46.8 | +18.2% |
| Owner earnings | 94.5 | 429.5 | 906.5 | 920.4 | 1,052.5 | 1,071.0 | +14.4% |
| Buybacks and share count | |||||||
| Dollars repurchased | 356.7 | 297.4 | 414.9 | 567.0 | 1,075.1 | 1,230.3 | +89.6% |
| Average price paid | $56.96† | $53.39 | $96.74 | $149.21 | $102.43 | $101.78 | — |
| Diluted shares | 166.7M† | 160.1M | 156.3M | 152.7M | 145.8M | ~143.0M‡ | — |
| Period-end shares | 161.9M† | 157.1M† | 153.6M | 150.2M | 140.0M | 136.7M | — |
FY2022 operating cash flow ($172.4M) was a working-capital trough, so FY2022-anchored cash-flow growth rates are flattered; on the clean FY2023 base, free cash flow compounded +34.0%/yr and owner earnings +35.4%/yr to FY2026.
† Split-adjusted arithmetically from the pre-split FY2022 filing (6-for-1 split, Sep 13, 2024). ‡ TTM EPS is the sum of the four filed quarterly EPS figures and TTM diluted shares their simple average — approximations, flagged as such; no model input depends on them.
Deckers carries no funded debt at all. Borrowing capacity is two undrawn revolving facilities: the Primary Credit Facility, $400M at Jun 30, 2026, upsized to $500M and extended to Aug 27, 2031 by the Aug 27, 2026 First Amendment, and a China facility of ≈$43.5M — both $0 drawn. Operating leases of $472.3M are excluded from the enterprise value (EV) bridge per house convention and sized in the Reverse DCF memo; a $3.2M supplier-finance obligation sits in payables and is not debt. Stockholders' equity was $2,301.7M at Jun 30, 2026.
| Market cap | 11,810.7 |
| Less: net cash | −1,602.6 |
| Enterprise value (EV) | 10,208.2 |
| Memo: EV incl. operating leases | 10,680.5 |
Buyback authorization history: $261M (2019) + $750M (2021) + $1,200M (2022) + $2,250M (May 21, 2025) + $3,500M (May 20, 2026), no expiry. $4,679.2M remained at Jul 9, 2026 (≈40% of market cap).
Inverting the price: for the enterprise value of $10,208.2M to be fair at a 10% required return, Deckers' owner earnings — free cash flow minus stock-based compensation — must compound at:
The three owner-earnings bases cluster within 0.4 points — there is no distortion to normalize away (SBC is 0.8% of revenue).
At a demonstrated 2%/yr net shrink the required TOTAL owner-earnings growth is −4.1%/yr; at 4%/yr, −6.0%/yr. Demonstrated shrink: period-end count −4.5%/yr FY2024→FY2026 and −6.8% in FY2026 alone; diluted count −3.3%/yr FY2022→FY2026.
CAP ≈ 0 years: at +12%, +15% and +20% growth, today's owner earnings capitalized at terminal terms alone — 12.75× = $13.7B — already exceed the entire EV. terminal value (TV) = 41.6% of EV; implied terminal EV/EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) 10.9×.
| Mature owner-earnings margin | Required revenue growth, 10 yrs | Context |
|---|---|---|
| 15% | +0.4%/yr | Below every year since FY2024 |
| ~19.5% | −2.2%/yr | The trailing level |
| 23% | −3.8%/yr | Above any delivered year |
Delivered revenue compounding: +14.8%/yr FY2022→FY2026; FY2027 guided +7–8%.
| Required return (hurdle) | 8% | 9% | 10% | 11% | 12% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flat bar | −5.6%/yr | −3.8%/yr | −2.1%/yr | −0.5%/yr | +1.0%/yr |
| Terminal growth | 1% | 2% (base) | 3% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flat bar | −1.4%/yr | −2.1%/yr | −3.0%/yr |
Memo: solving on EV incl. operating leases ($10,680.5M) moves the bar to −1.5%/yr. Yields: TTM owner earnings = 10.5% of EV; TTM buybacks $1,230.3M = 10.4% of market cap per year at the current pace.
Model assumptions: 10% hurdle, 10-year window, 2% terminal growth, terminal OE multiple 12.75× (return on invested capital faded to cost of capital), no exit multiples, no analyst estimates, solves on EV $10,208.2M.
Stefano Caroti (CEO since Aug 1, 2024) and chief financial officer (CFO) Steven Fasching run a guidance machine that has not cut a guide in 12 quarters. What holds the grade at B+ is not operations — it is the Form 4 record.
Guidance A−. Zero cuts in 12 quarters; FY2025 and FY2026 both beat their initial and final guides on revenue, gross margin (GM) and EPS. The blemish: FY2026's full-year guide was withheld for two quarters amid tariff uncertainty — an availability gap counted here, with the candor of withholding rather than guessing scored there.
Execution A−. HOKA compounded +30.5%/yr FY2022–FY2026 under a deliberately rationed wholesale-door strategy; UGG was re-accelerated from −2.7% (FY2023) to +13.1% (FY2025) at a 59.3% brand gross margin; consolidated gross margin added 6.7 points (51.0% → 57.7%); inventory fell −4.9% YoY at the seasonal peak; Sanuk was sold and Koolaburra/AHNU exited with no material exit costs. Debits: domestic revenue +0.2% in FY2026, and HOKA's slowest print (+7.7%, Q1 FY2027) still to be explained by the Oct 22 print.
Candor A−. Management withheld the FY2026 guide rather than guide blind, and labeled the $150M tariff figure gross when pressed — Fasching, May 22, 2025: The $150 is a gross number.
They called their own Q2 FY2026 favorability tariff timing that would reverse, paired the ~$25M net tariff figure with a “not the run-rate” caveat, and put U.S. consumer pressure on the record — Fasching, Oct 23, 2025: the U.S. consumer is a little bit more pressured
. Debits: no investor day in 24 months; HOKA door counts refused.
Capital allocation B+ — two vintages. FY2025: 3.8M shares at a $149.21 average, bought into strength — deeply underwater. FY2026: 10.5M shares at $102.43, the biggest quarter at the trough (3.77M shares at $92.36 in Q3 FY2026); Q1 FY2027 continued (3.26M at $103.79). The board enlarged the authorization twice instead of slowing into the drawdown, and the FY2027 EPS guide assumes buybacks ≈ 80% of free cash flow. Even so, at $86.58 the FY2026 vintage is ~15% underwater — FY2025's vintage is why this is B+, not A−.
Alignment C+ — the Form 4 record. Across Oct 2024–Oct 2026 (143 filings), insiders sold $27.77M against $0.20M bought — ~139×. The only open-market purchase was Board Chair Cindy Davis's $0.20M buy — 1,825 shares at $109.76 on Jun 6, 2025. CEO Caroti sold 15,000 shares non-plan at $175.73 on Nov 19, 2024, three and a half months into the job, and 14,274 more under a plan at $208.34 on Dec 11, 2024 — the window's highest insider price. Former CEO Dave Powers was the largest seller ($9.60M). Directors and officers own 0.4%. Mitigants: zero pledges or prepaid forwards (policy prohibits them); pay is performance-weighted, though quantum is full (Caroti FY2026 comp $11.90M, pay ratio 231:1, say-on-pay ~89.7% at the Sep 2026 meeting, from 92.7%); and no insider sales at all after Feb 13, 2026.
People (Fisher 5): an internal promote (Caroti, omni-channel, briefly HOKA) succeeded a clean retirement — Powers took no executive-chair or consulting role and left the board in Sep 2025; succession was orderly and disclosed a year ahead (8-K, Feb 1, 2024).
Fisher's capstone — integrity, assessed on behavior: candor in words is A− (guides withheld rather than invented, tariff figures labeled gross when pressed); the Form 4 record is the deeds ledger, and it caps this grade at B+ until the buying side of it changes.
Teva's standalone economics — UNANSWERED: not disclosed after FY2024 (inside Other brands, $146.2M FY2026 and shrinking).
The caveats stand: fashion cycles are fast and HOKA's share is re-won each product cycle; UGG demand is discretionary and season-exposed; Q3 is the peak quarter.
Leverage misjudged is Pabrai's own repeated mistake — checked twice here.
Three flags are live — insider selling, buyback timing at strength, and the two-brand moat itself. Each is already priced into the debates above or gated by a dated checkpoint; none is unaddressed, and the moat flag is carried in the verdict box's moat line.
No investor day has been held in 24 months (verified); strategy is communicated only through guidance, and the FY2028–30 framework is scored at these checkpoints instead.